It is intriguing to understand how power works in the Westminster system of government. Take the case of the commissioner of police. The prime minister appoints the Police Service Commission after consultation with the leader of the Opposition. From there the PSC enjoys independence from the executive along the lines set out by the Constitution (Chapter 9). It nominates and recommends removal of police commissioners.

At the same time, the executive in Jamaica fired the public service commission when the prime minister objected to its selection of Professor Stephen Vasciannie as solicitor general. The merit of that use of power was never legally tested since the case was settled out of court. That settlement, however, indicates that he might have been advised that he had overstepped his power.

lost confidence

At the present time also, the prime minister told parliament his Cabinet had lost confidence in Rear Admiral Hardley Lewin as commissioner of police. Lewin was not fired. He resigned. There was no evidence that the prime minister used his strong arm to muscle the PSC or Lewin. However, there are intrigues.

A very telling Gleaner front-page report by Gary Spaulding (November 2, 2009) the day following Lewin's resignation, said a few things that piqued interest. Lewin had spoken of pressure for his removal from "the political hierarchy, the police force, the business elite and even the media". There are many centres of power within Westminster and in the shadows beyond the formal Westminster centres as well. We are not sure precisely what combination of those powers caused Cabinet to lose confidence in Lewin.

pressured out

It does seem as though he was pressured out. As that Gleaner report reminded us, it had been public knowledge for weeks that he was under pressure. However, he made an interesting comment. He wore the badge of the Jamaica Constabulary Force, "not the Bermuda Police Force". Bermuda, not being an independent country, a higher power (say, the Governor) can intrude on the powers of the commissioner there. Was Mr Lewin alluding to this danger in Jamaica and his intention to reject any likely unconstitutional intrusion? In the end, he did not. He resigned.

Probably Lewin felt the substantive powers of Westminster and the shadow powers in society were too well-organised. In a speech to the Police Civic Committee of Mandeville in May 2008, Peter Bunting had asked, "Was the prime minister trying to appease certain interests when he appointed Colonel Trevor MacMillan minister of national security?"

Probably, he mused, it was in part that and a knee jerk reaction. MacMillan was chairman of the Standing Committee on National Security of the Private Sector Organisation of Jamaica. Was that the "certain interests" behind the removal of his predecessor and his appointment?

PROFESSIONALISM AND PREJUDICE

Just weeks before he resigned, Lewin said, "should the Police Service Commission or the prime minister have any issue with me or my leadership, then by just a simple statement that there are issues, my professional response would be to step aside and make room for somebody else." There were indeed no grounds of professional misconduct, breach of contract, breach of the constitution, or failure to achieve any target given for the loss of confidence in Lewin.

The modern public sector emerged 150 years ago to establish professionalism and merit as the basis for employment, promotion, discipline and security of tenure by public servants, in order to replace political prejudice, class, patronage and favouritism, which had been rife in Britain. What exactly led those in our political hierarchy, police force, business elite, and even media, to put pressure on Cabinet to lose confidence in Lewin?

The Government said it had lost confidence in Lewin's ability to bring crime down. However, this only raises more questions about the Westminster system and the Government's role in it. Didn't the ruling party promise in its election campaign to reduce crime quickly and drastically? Where then does responsibility lie? Does it lie with the minister or the commissioner? Judging from the Government's actions so far, the score is a tie. Two commissioners have gone and two ministers have been replaced.

Lewin seems to believe the political directorate should take responsibility, or at least, its fair share. He had said the political directorate had failed to provide him with a crime plan. He said he had the strategic priorities in place. What he needed were the grand strategies for sustainable, long-term solutions.

The Government didn't have a plan despite having a shadow minister of national security for 14 years, who lasted for only eight months as minister, probably removed by shadow powers. A commissioner of 1993 to 1996 succeeded him. He was author of the "MacMillan Crime Plan", commissioned by Golding in Opposition. Its author, Colonel MacMillan, never implemented the plan when he became commissioner.

confusion of responsibility

I too, had thought, as Lewin believes, that the executive's responsibility for policy and that of the police for operational leadership, had been settled during Macmillan's controversial tenure as police commissioner more than 13 years before. The confusion of responsibility is further underscored in Golding's statement to Parliament on the commissioner's resignation. Referring to a meeting of the National Security Council (on October 21), he said, "I requested that the police submit to Cabinet, through the minister of national security, a strategic crime plan". It is difficult to untangle the bundling of responsibility from among the prime minister, Cabinet, minister, commissioner, and National Security Council, who all share responsibility.

CRIME AND POLITICS

Lewin had also complained loudly about the political complicity behind garrison constituencies being breeding grounds for crime. He once famously declared Tivoli Gardens the "mother of all garrisons". We now know the cold reality of that statement.

It would indeed be difficult for the commissioner of police to work with a Cabinet headed by a prime minister whose constituency harboured the "mother of all garrisons", if rooting out the evil in that and other garrisons brings the police commissioner and the executive into conflict. In effect, the independence between the executive and police service would be compromised by the unity of constituency breeding grounds for crime and executive interest in those constituencies.

Like the 'Dudus' Coke story, the loss of Derick Latibeaudiere and Lewin's services have hit the international press. Connections are subtly made. The Economist reported that Lewin's departure came after he made the comment to "break the linkages between organised criminal networks, our politics, business, community, and ... the police". If that is the case, Westminster-Whitehall is in trouble.

When Westminster, the political arm of the Westminster-Whitehall system turns against Whitehall, the administrative arm, government comes to attack itself. It cannot focus its energy on attacking crime and economic recession. Carolyn Gomes of Jamaicans for Justice wrote in 2007 that Westminster parliamentary systems in the Caribbean "concentrate astonishing power in the hands of the prime minister". This power extended to appointing the PSC, the minister of national security and the police commissioner. She had not even factored shadow power.

Lewin

Robert Buddan lectures in the Department of Government, UWI, Mona. Email: Robert.Buddan@ uwimona.edu.jm or columns