Today Barack Obama has critical decisions to take. He must contemplate the 'public option' - government provided care competing with private insurers - for health care delivery, how to respond to Fox News in its intensified role as spearhead of the far right movement (if not specifically the Republican Party), plus two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan/Pakistan.

These situations are all complex with big consequences, yet one gets the feeling that his administration is up to the task. There appears to be a method in apparent slow motion dilly-dallying on some fronts.

In the months of summer, Town Hall meetings were disrupted by protesters, some bearing arms; most exhibiting coarse, hostile behaviour. The health care agenda appeared torpedoed as Republican strategy to defeat the President, to make it his Waterloo, seemed vibrant. Today, the less than out-front strategy Obama preferred seems to be paying off. His personal poll numbers are rising and support for the 'public option' grows nationwide.

Confidential advice

On Afghanistan, General Stanley McCrystal's confidential strategic advice and request for 40,000 more troops was leaked to the press.

Washington leaks aren't caused by faulty plumbers.

If plumbers they are, leakers are also exceptionally well versed in the art of forcing political decisions by influencing public opinion through selective release of secret information.

There is friction between the White House and US commanders - at least so news reports tell us.

Beyond that, the President is taking his time over the decision.

During his campaign he said the US presence in Afghanistan was part of 'just war' - completely different from Iraq - a war of choice waged on fictitious intelligence, too costly in blood and treasure.

Balance desires

The population agreed with him, gave him a mandate. Now at the crunch, he has to balance desires of supporters on the Democratic Party left - the anti-war group - centrist Democrats and tremendous opposition to be anticipated from hawks on the US right.

The latter seems to view peacemaking as weakness, and any act of recognition or discussion with the "enemy" or for that matter even America's European allies, as compromising homeland security.

It would be a mistake to think, however, that Obama's deliberative and time-consuming situational assessment is merely another aspect of his cool, 'no-drama Obama' mantra.

It is, perhaps, more correct to view, delay as the result of fundamental lessons learnt from history. Particularly that of the Vietnam War and the oh-so-reluctantly-dribbled out opinions and recollections coming from Robert McNamara and McGeorge Bundy on their relation with President Johnson during critical periods of that conflict.

Both men lived with their confidences and consciences until close to the end of their lives.

Indeed, permission to publish some material and interviews were granted only upon their passing.

Robert McNamara was secretary of defence and key architect of the Vietnam War.

He came from a successful career at the Ford Motor Company where he had been president for less than five weeks when President Kennedy asked him to serve. McGeorge Bundy was national security adviser to President Lyndon Johnson. Bob Woodward and Gordon M. Goldstein in the Washington Post's October 18 edition lay out for us how Bundy, in a final series of interviews before his death in 1996, describes how Johnson's short-term political concerns trumped grand strategy for Vietnam.

"LBJ isn't deeply concerned about ... who governs South Vietnam - he's deeply concerned with what the average American voter is going to think about how he did in the ball game of the Cold War."

Bundy continued: "The great Cold War Championship gets played in the largest stadium in the United States, and he, Lyndon Johnson, is the quarterback, and if he loses, how does he do in the next election? So don't lose ... He's living with his own political survival every time he looks at these questions."

The two reporters also mentioned the final interview with McNamara. When asked how a country could really learn from its mistakes he said: "I think you break by writing thoughtful retrospective reviews of what we've done in the past that may apply to the current situation or the future."

I think Barack Obama and his team are fully aware of these and other significant reflections as well as specific memoirs of past decision-makers.

They recognise that short-run political gain cannot be the sole driver of decisions but also that Afghanistan could prove worse than Vietnam. There's no harm in looking at thoughtful retrospective views. Herein lies the value of memoirs and reflections.

Would it not be a good thing if we had retrospectives from the teams that dealt with Jamaica's 1970s discussions with the International Monetary Fund? What happened to emergency production plans and why? Once we can isolate the 'whys' of our failures we stand a better chance of future success.

Sure we can revive small farm agricultural output, exploit the prowess of our athletes, and deploy sports, health and environment-friendly tourism. Question is, who's to do it? What's the mix of private and public sector? Who sacrifices and who defines the 'good life'?

wilbe65@yahoo.com